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Abstract:
It has been 26 years since Mongolia transitioned to democracy. I decided to
evaluate the progress of Mongolia’s development since the transition to evaluate whether
the country of only 3 million people with vast land and natural resources successfully
implemented policies to attain growth and societal wellbeing. In order to evaluate
Mongolia’s development progress, this thesis uses FDI in Mongolian development since
1990 as a case study to examine the relationship between FDI, state development
strategies, and development outcomes. My research questions encompass a series of
interrelated inquiries including 1) whether human development can be achieved through
extraction industries 2) whether the source of FDI has a strong impact on development
outcomes, and 3) whether FDI influences state-led development efforts and decision
making to the extent that it threatens the development of Mongolian sovereignty.
I conclude that Mongolia is at a crossroads. Foreign direct investment in the
extraction industry can either help or harm Mongolian development; the long-term results
of FDI will depend upon the Mongolian government’s actions. The source of the FDI
does not have a strong impact on development outcomes. There are some differences in
industry conduct regarding transparency and corporate social responsibility based upon
the source of funding. The main responsibility for attaining development falls to the
Mongolian government. However, my research indicates that FDI could have a corrosive
impact on state sovereignty if the state is weak in enforcing rule of law. Surprisingly, I
find that a strong, active civil society is necessary to maintain the integrity of
development strategies in the face of significant FDI.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
The year 1990 was a turning point for the Mongolian people. The fall of the
Soviet Union allowed its longtime satellite state, Mongolia to create its own path towards
development. Like many postcolonial states, Mongolia adopted a democratic system of
governance and a capitalist free market economy to advance the country’s economic
growth and societal progress. Fast-forward 26 years later, I decided to evaluate the
progress of Mongolia’s development. I wanted to address whether a country of only 3
million people with vast land and natural resources has successfully implemented policies
to stimulate economic growth and development.
In the past, the Mongolian economy depended on agriculture and traditional
herding. Today, Mongolia is a developing country with abundant mineral resources. The
recent mining boom in Mongolia has helped the Mongolian Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) grow at a double-digit rate in 2011 and 2012. Some have gone as far calling
Mongolia “Minegolia” (Langfitt, 2012). Mongolia’s natural resources are exported to its
southern neighbor, China, whose rapid industrialization requires significant amount of
natural resources. The insatiable Chinese demand for natural resources became the
perfect market for Mongolia’s export sector. The vast amount of mineral riches quickly
turned the Mongolian extraction industry to become the biggest contributor to the
country’s GDP.
In order to develop its extraction industries, the Mongolian government
increasingly relies on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) for infrastructure and technology
development. Foreign investors have provided a substantial amount of funds to develop
Mongolia’s extraction industry. Currently, copper and coal are the top export
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commodities that provide a significant contribution to the Mongolian economy (The
Observatory of Economic Complexity, n.d.).
Given Mongolia’s abundant natural resources, Mongolia has the opportunity to
use extraction industries to jumpstart development. This thesis evaluates Mongolia’s
development progress by examining the promise and pitfalls of FDI in the extraction
industry by using post-1990 Mongolia as a case study. This thesis employs comparative
case study of the mines to investigate whether the extraction industry can lead an
effective and sustainable development strategy. Additionally, I look at whether the source
of the FDI makes a difference in development efforts. Finally, I look at the factors of
state regulation and management of FDI, and the involvement of civil society in creating
accountability for state sponsored development strategies.
Thus, the research questions encompasses series of interrelated inquiries including
1) whether human development can be achieved through extraction industries 2) whether
the source of FDI has a strong impact on development outcomes, and 3) whether FDI
influences state-led development efforts and decision making to the extent that it
threatens the development of Mongolian sovereignty. These series of inquiries will help
in understanding the relationship between FDI, state led development strategies and
development outcomes.
In the end, I conclude that the extraction industry can either help or harm
Mongolian development; the long-term results of FDI will depend upon the Mongolian
government’s actions in managing the FDI. In terms of understanding FDI’s role in
development outcomes, I conclude that the source of FDI does not significantly impact
the development outcomes. There are some variances in the business conduct of the
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companies’ transparency and corporate responsibility. However, the development
outcome depends more on the state’s ability to manage foreign investments. Finally, my
investigation into whether FDI can influence state decision-making process showed that
FDI could have an adverse effect on the state sovereignty. The comparative case study
showed that foreign investors could diminish state sovereignty by challenging rule of law
in the host country. Such hindrances to the exercise of state sovereignty by the foreign
investors could result in erosion of the state. However, most importantly, the case study
showed that it requires a strong civil society to hold the government accountable for
maintaining the integrity of development strategies in the face of large FDI.
The following chapter will begin by drawing knowledge from existing bodies of
literature on development theories, Chinese Foreign Direct Investment patterns, and
extraction industries. Chapter Three will consist of background information on the
current state of political and economic development in Mongolia. Chapter Four contains
the methodology this research utilizes to examine the case studies. Chapter Five contains
a comparative case study of two prominent mines in Mongolia to demonstrate the
dynamics of FDI in the extraction industry. Finally, Chapter Six analyzes the results of
this comparison and concludes this research.
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW
This thesis draws knowledge from three existing bodies of literature to help assess
current trends in development in Mongolia. The first section of this literature review
surveys the evolution of ideas about development to aid in understanding the recent
trends in Mongolia. I also review recent literature on Chinese foreign direct investment in
order to provide an understanding of how Chinese influence has expanded over the years
and how Mongolia is impacted by their economic influence. The final section explains
the role of extraction industries in the development process. Together, this literature
provides a background for understanding current development conditions in Mongolia.
Development Theories
Economic development discourse became a central issue following World War II.
It was shaped by the Western Allies’ efforts to provide financial support to exert political
influence in newly emerging independent states (Staples, 2006). American foreign policy
sought to ensure that the newly independent states would not fall under the communist
bloc. Cold War politics encouraged the promotion of capitalism in emerging developing
countries (Staples, 2006). Although there have been different approaches to development,
five main theories are most prominent: modernization, structuralism, dependency theory,
neoclassical theory, and recently, theories concerning sustainable human development.
Over time, development theories evolved as scholars differed over the best means of
attaining economic, social and political progress in underdeveloped countries. In the
more established notions of development, stimulating economic growth was given
significant emphasis (Staples, 2006). However, current development discourse is shifting
towards a stronger consensus that rejects the exclusive focus on economic growth and
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moves towards sustainable development that also prioritizes human rights, sustainable
environment, and social, political and economic freedoms (Sachs, 2015; Stiglitz et al.,
2010; Hosseni, 2003; Alkire and Deneulin, 2009).
In the 1950 to 1960s, modernization theory was the dominant development
concept. Modernization theory stemmed from the American foreign policy that
encouraged developing countries to industrialize to foster economic growth and at the
same time, to discourage Communist affiliation (Engerman et al., 2003). Modernization
theory urged a complete break from traditional societies to embrace modernity as defined
by the West. One of the most influential modernization theorists, Walt W. Rostow,
established the model of linear “stages of growth” which asserted that developing
countries must go through certain stages of growth to achieve full development. The
initial stage involved breaking away from traditional society (Rostow, 1960).
Additionally, modernization theorists believed that all societies could achieve sustainable
development through implementing liberal capitalist policies (Engerman et al., 2003).
Modernization also meant mirroring the Western lifestyle by reforming the economic,
political and social structures of traditional society for “genuine development” including
industrialization, the adoption of western technology, and education centering on
capitalist economic development theories (Gilman, 2003).
In Inglehart and Baker’s (2000) analysis of modernization theory, they argued that
modernization is “probabilistic, not deterministic.” Unlike the modernization theorist
who believed in a mechanistic and linear process of development, they argue that
economic growth does not have a predictable growth pattern because there are too many
factors that can influence the outcome of development. Finally, they argued that
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economic growth does change some aspects of culture, but the values of a country do not
change easily due to fundamental differences in the value systems of rich and poor
nations (Ingelhart and Baker, 2000). Other critics of modernization theory postulate that
the linear development model is incorrect. Matunhu (2000) argues that the
oversimplification of modernization theory is its greatest fault. Not all countries follow
the same explicit linear path. The structural makeup of a particular developing country is
significantly different from rich, as well as other developing countries.
At the end of 1960’s to 1970’s, structuralist theorists gained popularity.
Structuralist discourse centered on Keynesian economics and advocated for government
intervention in some economic sectors and recommended institutional and market
structural reform (Lin, 2012; Fischer, 2015; Cimoli and Porcile, 2010; Storm, 2015).
Structuralist theorists maintained that the failure of previous development theories was
due to inapplicable development models imposed by Western dominance. In developing
countries, capitalist economic policies were not successful in stimulating economic
growth due to structural makeup of the developing countries.
Additionally, structuralist scholars argued that underdevelopment of developing
countries persists due to the technological and industrial structure differences. Developed
countries have superior industrial market and technology over the developing countries
(Cimoli and Porcile, 2010). The developed countries use their superior industrial markets
and technology to suppress the developing countries’ economies. Therefore, the authors
argue that the best strategy for development is to reduce the technology gap, increase
international competitiveness and encourage developing countries’ export industry to
compete in the global market. (Cimoli and Porcile, 2001).
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In the recent structuralist discourse, authors Lin (2012) and Ghose (2010) argue
that the inequality between developed and developing countries is due to a substantial
income and technology gap. The authors agree that structural adjustment is necessary for
eliminating the gap between the rich and poor countries. Previous theory on
modernization advocated for a complete break from the traditional society, however,
Ghose (2010) argues that traditional industry can coexist with modern industries. The
simultaneous development of both traditional and modern industries can help close
income inequality.
Following the 1970s, international dependency theory emerged to explain
development. Dependency theory argues that in the capitalist world, there is an uneven
division of labor between developed and developing countries (Todaro and Smith, 2009).
The World Systems Theory developed by Immanuel Wallerstein argues that the world is
divided into core, semi-periphery, and periphery based upon an international division of
labor (Wallerstein, 2004). Core (developed) countries have a strong central government
with capital-intensive industries and a highly skilled workforce. Peripheries are the
developing countries that lack strong government, labor-intensive industries and a lowskilled workforce. Semi-peripheries are developing countries that are industrializing
countries that fall between the core and the periphery. They all operate in a capitalist
world economy where the core controls international markets and develop unequal trade
relations benefitting the core, but not the rest of the world (Wallerstein, 2004). Todaro
and Smith add that the core’s exploitive activities in the (periphery) countries perpetuate
underdevelopment of the developing countries. In other words, the authors contend that
underdevelopment was an externally induced phenomenon by the developed countries as
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a result of the power imbalance. (Todaro and Smith, 2009). Vernengo (2006) adds that
the core conducts its power through the means of financial dependency. Developing
countries require a substantial amount of financial loans to develop technology,
infrastructure, and industrial sectors.
At the end of the 1970s, neoliberalism became the central development discourse.
The framework for neoliberal theory relied on adopting the Westernization tenets from
modernization theory; however, neoliberal theorists relied on market forces rather than
state actions. The theorists argued that too much state intervention, inefficiency in
resource allocation, and lack of economic incentives to stimulate economic growth causes
underdevelopment (Lin, 2012; Todaro and Smith, 2009). Lin (2012) writes that the
neoliberal school of thought firmly believed that free markets, privatization, free trade
and deregulation of government would stimulate economic growth, and the growth would
eventually “trickle down” to alleviate poverty (Lin, 2012).
Critics of neoliberal policies argue that such policies are often unsuccessful in
developing countries because of the fundamental nature of the institutional, economic and
the social structure of the developing countries (Todaro and Smith, 2009). Many of the
developing countries in Latin America failed to develop through neoliberal policies due
to the political structure of central government and economies heavily controlled by the
government. Similarly, Lin (2012) argued that in the 20th century, countries like China
and India achieved remarkable economic growth without following the basic guidelines
of neoliberal policies. While the neoliberal theorists claim that the invisible hand of the
free market promotes the general welfare of the people, critics like Todaro and Smith
(2009) contend that on the contrary, the free market strategy helps those who are already
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well off (Todaro and Smiht, 2009). Similarly, John Rapley (2007) argued that although
neoliberal policies resulted in some positive gains in some of the more advanced
developing countries, in poorer countries, it was less effective, and in some places did
more harm than good. The neoliberal policies that opened up their market to cheap
international goods hurt local businesses and had an adverse effect on economic growth.
Additionally, Ruccio (2011) argued that economic policies imposed by Structural
Adjustment Programs (SAP) did not solve development problems but intensified income
inequality, social injustice, and environmental degradation.
In general, most development theories have a great emphasis on economic growth
as the answer to underdevelopment. However, starting in the 1980s, various development
theories questioned the previous development theories that were developed by the
Western countries. The post-development school of thought questioned theories such as
industrialization, modernization, and neo-liberalization and has expressed discontent with
the status quo (Schneider, 2010). Post-development theorists emphasize alternatives to
development that involve more local participation (Ziai, 2009).
Much like post-development theory, sustainable development theories appeal for
the reduction of capitalist production and consumption to focus on policies that benefit
the well-being of humans, as well as the sustainability of the environment. Schneider et
al. (2010) argue that sustainable development rejects principles that give prominence to
economic growth as the primary objective and argue that “sustainable degrowth” exposes
“growth fetishism” as the main problem of underdevelopment. Ross (2009) and Perkins
(2013) advocate for sustainable environment policies to curb consumption of energy,
environmental degradation, and air pollution. Additionally, Sachs (2015) contributes to
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sustainable development theories by advocating for good “economic prosperity, social
inclusion and cohesion, environmental sustainability, and good governance by major
social actors, including governments and business” (Sachs, 2015, pg.4). The author
accords responsibility to individual states and also to the international actors, such as
multinational corporations, that have the power to change policies.
Amartya Sen (1999) argues that development is distinct from economic growth.
His broader concept of development encompasses economic growth, but also prioritizes
improving the conditions of individuals by addressing poverty, unemployment, social and
economic inequality, and various forms of discrimination (Sen, 1999; Hosseni, 2003).
Additionally, Aknuluy et al. (2015) argued for alternative forms of development by
advocating the necessity of addressing the environmental cost of prioritizing economic
growth.
Similarly, prominent scholars like Stiglitz, Sen, Fitoussi (2010) and Hosseini
(2003) questioned the validity of using of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as the proper
means to measure growth and progress. Stiglitz et al. (2010) contended that there are too
many nuances to societal progress that an exclusive focus on GDP fails to include. The
authors explained that the multifaceted nature of societal wellbeing needs not only
aggregate data on income, but also its distribution (Stiglitz, et al., 2010).
Critics of these models of development like Sampath question the feasibility of
constructing a new vision for development with an emphasis on societal wellbeing.
Sampath (2014) states that it is not feasible for scholars to produce a development
discourse based on assessing societal wellbeing due to its multidimensional nature.
However, scholars Alkire and Deneulin (2009) posit that evaluating people’s freedoms
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could assess societal well-being. According to Alkire and Deneulin, enriching people’s
freedom of self-determination to a healthy life, education, employment and political and
social participation is the foundation of development (Alkire and Deneulin, 2009). The
principle argument is to reimagine growth, not in economic terms, but as social and
political improvement. Societal growth includes economic sustainability, environmental
protection, addressing income inequality, poverty measurement, and advocating for
quality of life for all (Stiglitz et al., 2010; Hosseni, 2003; Alkire and Deneulin, 2009).
Additionally, some have attempted to incorporate human rights into development
discourse. Marks (2010) argues that human rights and development studies share a
common goal towards progress in societal well-being.
Marks (2010) states the following: … human rights and development share a
common finality and a concern with the potential of empowerment, suggesting a
more hopeful role for human rights in development, as a vehicle for
empowerment and social transformation in which human rights are development
objectives. (p.2)
The evolution of development theories post WWII suggests that economic growth
is no longer the singular focus of development. History has shown that capitalist policies
were not successful in stimulating economic growth, but rather perpetuated
underdevelopment. In recent years, development has surpassed the significance of
economic growth to embrace societal well-being, people’s freedoms and protection of
human rights.
The following section surveys literature on Chinese foreign direct investment.
Since the early 2000s, China has been rapidly industrializing and expanding its
international power. One of its strategies for expansion is outward foreign direct
investment. China has become an alternative to the existing Western financial institutions
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for international aid, loans, and investment. The following section will help assess
Chinese investment practices overseas, and help contextualize its practices in Mongolia.
Chinese Foreign Direct Investment
Some scholars have argued that the source of FDI matter in foreign investment
practices. The following bodies of literature focuses on Chinese foreign direct investment
due to the strong political and economic ties between China and Mongolia. Since China
is the biggest trading partner of Mongolia, the Mongolian economy is highly dependent
on the Chinese demand for Mongolia’s export commodity. Therefore, it is important to
take a look at Chinese FDI specifically.
China’s outward direct investment (ODI) has grown substantially over the last
decade. According to the 2016 World Investment Report from the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), China is the third largest outward
investor in the world, following the United States and Japan respectively (UNCTAD,
2016). The scale and the extent of Chinese investment grew exponentially since the
introduction of the “Going-Out” economic policy of 2001. The chart in Figure 1 shows
the growth of Chinese outward investment. The Chinese government actively encouraged
foreign investment in the developing countries through loans, bilateral and multilateral
trade and various forms of debt cancellation. The Chinese ODI has been rapidly growing
in three distinct sectors: service, manufacturing, and mining. These Chinese industries
invest all over the world in areas ranging from developed countries like United States,
Canada and Australia to developing poor nations like Sudan, Nigeria, and Myanmar.
Although China’s investment contributes significantly to the developing countries, there
have been common concerns over its investment motivations and implications.
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Figure 1

Chinese Annual FDI Outflows 2000-2014
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According to Jiang (2009), Chinese strategy for ODI is an externalization of its
development paradigm. The author contends there is a linkage between Chinese domestic
development policies and its actions overseas. Chinese extraction strategy is driven by its
need to secure natural resources and its aggressive measures to secure them is evident in
its domestic and international practices. These aggressive measures can result in
detrimental social consequences in the host countries, such as unsafe work conditions that
can lead to industrial accidents, environmental disasters from extraction industries, and
economic inequality (Jiang, 2009).
Kolstad and Wiig’s (2012) research reveals that there is a distinct political pattern
to the investment decisions of Chinese ODI. First, Chinese companies are attracted to
large markets of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
countries. Chinese manufacturing services target large markets to export cheap
commodities.
Second, Chinese foreign direct investment in natural resources target countries
with weak institutions and abundant natural resources. Further analysis indicates that this
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second pattern is valid to non-OECD countries (Kolstad & Wiig, 2012). Additional
research by the authors finds that Chinese oil extraction industries in Africa are likely to
prop up repressive regimes, benefiting a few elites while the majority of Africans see
little to no benefit to their investment (Kolstad & Wiig, 2011). For example, the authors
assert that China invests in the Sudanese oil industry even though other Western investors
condemned Sudanese human rights violations and terminated their trade deals (Wiig and
Kolstad, 2011). China used the investment vacuum as an opportunity to import Sudanese
oil, while exporting manufactured good and weapons to Sudan (Wiig and Kolstad, 2011).
Tan (2012) posits that another motivation for China’s overseas investment is to
diversify Chinese markets and strengthen Chinese financial positions in the international
arena. The author adds that the Chinese global expansion is to create an alternative
financial framework to the one developed by Western countries. China’s strategy to
increase its competitiveness in the international market involves various financial
assistance to African countries in the form of debt relief, loans with longer terms than the
Western financial organizations, and loans with little to no political restrictions (Peh and
Eyal, 2010). Similarly, Mol (2011) adds that Chinese banks gain an advantage by
providing lower ethical and environmental standards than an international organization
such as WB, IMF and EU Investment Bank. Consequently, Western financial institutions
claim that China’s “no strings attached policies” undermine international standards and
promote widespread corruption (Peh and Eyal, 2010).
The employment practices of Chinese investment overseas are questionable. Peh
and Eyal (2010) explain that many Chinese migrant workers are often assigned
managerial jobs, while hired African workers work in negligent and unsafe work
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environments. In addition to the improper work environment, some Chinese companies
force workers to work overtime and disregard local labor laws (Anshan, 2007). In 2011,
Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported labor abuses in the Chinese Copper Mines in
Zambia. In the report, HRW claimed that Chinese companies provided insufficient
protection for workers’ safety and wellbeing. Many of the workers risked their health by
working without a proper gear (HRW, 2011). Anshan (2007) adds many workers were
threatened with termination if the employees voiced complaints or refused to work.
Additionally, Anshan (2007) argues that local employment suffers due to Chinese
company managers’ preference for hiring Chinese nationals. Often, the local
communities do not believe that the Chinese companies contribute sufficiently to the
local economy when locals do not have employment opportunities (Adisu et al., 2010).
Jiang (2009) explains that the Chinese exploitative domestic policies on low
wageworkers are reflected in their overseas employment practices.
Chinese presence has also had an adverse impact on the economic conditions of
the host countries. Adisu et al., (2010) argue that the expansion of trade relations between
China and the African nations have benefited China more than the African countries. Peh
and Eyal (2010) reason that Chinese trade could lead to a low-cost manufacturing base in
a host country that could hurt existing industries. For example, hypothetically, a Chinese
textile factory in Vietnam can hurt existing Vietnamese textile business by providing
cheaper, low-cost manufactured goods. Additionally, cheap Chinese commodities can
enter the host countries’ market and compete with the domestic businesses. Adisu et al.
(2010) revealed that the African markets became flooded with cheap Chinese products
causing competition between domestic markets and Chinese manufacturers. Local
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industries cannot compete with the low prices of Chinese commodities and ultimately
lose business to the Chinese manufacturers (Adisu et al., 20.10).
One of the most criticized aspects of Chinese investment practices overseas is
their lack of environmental consideration. Jiang (2009) argues that Chinese domestic
environmental policies (or the lack there of) translate to its lackluster international
environmental policies. The author argues that since the structure of domestic Chinese
environmental policies entails lax regulations and the absence of strong enforcement,
Chinese companies are unlikely to promote effective environmental consideration in their
business practices abroad (Jang, 2009). Accordingly, Chinese enterprises exploit African
countries that do not possess strict environmental regulations.
In 2014, the Chinese government introduced “Guidelines for Social
Responsibility in Outbound Mining Investments” to address human rights, labor issues,
and environmental issues. However, the guidelines are recommendations and are not
enforceable (Moi, 2011). Tang-Lee (2015) adds that the policies are more of a placation
than a resolution. Chinese companies provide short-term concessions while neglecting
major community grievances. Consequently, the scholars recommend a serious change in
the regulation practices of Chinese enterprises and stricter policy regulations in the host
countries (Tang-Lee, 2015).
The literature on Chinese foreign investment practices in natural resources reveals
interesting results. First, Chinese investment is motivated by the need to secure natural
resources for its rapid industrialization. Often, this motivation leads to aggressive
measures to attain natural resources. Second, China is not only enhancing its domestic
power, but it is also expanding its international power. Until recently, China was an
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investor seeker, but recently, it has positioned itself to become an investment provider.
The China has become a global player through its successful “going out” policy.
The following section presents literature on the extraction industries. The
scholarly work analyzes the effect of extraction-led development. The knowledge drawn
from this investment discourse can help explain how Mongolia can attain development by
prioritizing extraction industries, and the risks associated with resource-led development.
Extraction Industries
Many capital-scarce developing countries attempt economic growth through
extraction industries with very limited success. The economic underperformance of
resource-rich countries has garnered much attention and research. Many have debated the
failure of economic growth in resource-rich countries. Most studies suggest that there is
evidence of a “resource curse” where countries with abundant natural resources tend to
experience slower economic growth (Bhattacharyya and Collier, 2011). Others argue
resources themselves are not a curse; they can bring opportunities for economic growth,
but the weak political and regulatory structure can lead to a slow economic development
(Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik, 2006). Countries with weak institutions are hurt by
resource abundance because weak institutions are susceptible to corruption and the
revenue from the resources can enrich elite few. Therefore, the resource boom becomes a
“resource curse.” However, in institutionally strong countries, resource revenue is
invested into the domestic economy and can become a “blessing.”
Some scholars argue that natural resource revenues can contribute to national
economic growth if the government of the resource-rich country takes advantage of it.
Bhattacharyya and Collier (2011) argue that conceptually, it is simple to image economic
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growth through a resource boom. The government can tax resource rent for potential
investors, and use the revenues to invest domestically, which can encourage economic
growth. However, this scenario has not usually panned out. Natural resource-led
development alters the structure of the economy. Venables (2016) explains that this
phenomenon is considered a “Dutch Disease” where extraction industries’ displace other
tradable industries, causing a decline in the country’s competitiveness in the international
market. Similarly, Sachs and Warner (2001) also argued that resource abundant countries
tend to focus on extraction industries and are likely to neglect developing other export
industries. Fast revenues from mining encourage more profit allocations to develop the
mining sector further while other tradable sectors like agriculture become defunded and
neglected. Extraction-led development creates a new economic structure highly
dependent on the revenues of one sector (Venables, 2016; Sachs and Warner, 2001).
The problem of dependency is that resource revenues can be highly volatile. Pegg
(2006) reasons that when countries become dependent on an extractive industry, they also
become more vulnerable to economic shock. Resource revenues depend on the stability
of the international market prices of the product. A price of a commodity can be highly
unstable and unpredictable. If the market price of a product falls, so does the resource
revenue. Therefore, the government is dependent upon highly risky income to meet its
budget (Pegg, 2006). Additionally, Venables (2016) contend that weak governments have
a difficult time with fiscal discipline. The increase in revenues allows the government to
postpone crucial economic policies and push policies to that advance extraction industry
(Venables, 2016).

18

There is a significant amount of research that argues that the institutional makeup
of a country determines if a resource boom is a blessing or a curse. The failures of
African resource rich countries are well known. However, countries like the United
States, Australia, and Canada were once resource wealthy countries and were able to
achieve substantial economic growth. Pegg (2006) argues that countries like the United
States, Canada, and Australia differ from the African countries because of stable legal
and financial institutions existed in those countries before their extractive industries
developed.
Venables (2016) argue that resource politics can play out in democratic as well as
autocratic countries. However, adverse resource politics are more apparent in
authoritarian states. Ross (2001) explains that authoritarian governments are more likely
favor the needs of the wealthy than the poor. In such countries, the poor do not have the
power to voice their concerns to influence government policies (Ross, 2001). Resourcedependent countries spend revenues bolstering their security to help suppress protestors
and activist against the government. Venables (2016) also argue that resource revenues
can encourage autocratic leaders to consolidate power and often, increase the risk of
conflict. Pegg (2006) cites a World Bank study that revealed countries with greater
dependency on resource revenue are significantly more at risk of conflict. Furthermore, a
primary cause of the conflict was related to the allocation of resource revenues. Ferguson
(2006) takes the argument further and explains that many extractive industries in Africa
use private militaries to ensure control over the extraction industries. Ferguson (2006)
recalls the security-led approach of the Angolan model, featuring private corporations
that exploit natural resource rich territories and then employ private militaries to ensure
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security while corrupt government officials provide legal rights to the corporation as a
bribe. Sachs and Warner (2001) similarly argue that the in such conditions, the country is
no longer in a developmental state, but a predatory one.
According to scholars, resource dependence has a negative effect on poverty.
Ross (2015) concluded that in the analyses of resource dependence and Human
Development Index (HDI), there was a strong correlation on mineral dependence with a
lower standard of living and a high rate of poverty. The author argues that in corrupt,
resource-rich countries, revenues from the resources are unlikely to be invested in public
programs such as health, education, and poverty alleviation (Ross, 2015). The revenues
from resource extraction stay in the pockets of few elites, while a majority of the public
do not benefit from the resource profits.
One of the social benefits of economic development through extractive industries
is the promise of infrastructure development. However, Pegg (2006) argues investors
often develop infrastructure in strategic methods where infrastructure primarily benefits
corporate use. For example, newly built roads and transportation systems are targeted
towards helping the investors rather than the locals (Pegg, 2006).
Additionally, some scholars argue that extractive industries can create jobs in the
mining sector and income from employment will generate economic growth. While it is
certainly true that a resource boom creates employment, Pegg (2006) argues that
extractive industries are not labor intensive but capital intensive. Thus, the creation of
jobs is rather small in comparison to other industries such as agriculture. Furthermore,
extractive industries can have an adverse impact on the unemployment rate. Since the
non-mining sectors lose competitiveness in the international market, industries close
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down causing an increase in the level of unemployment. Additionally, some corporations
bring foreign workers to work in the mines and do not contribute to the local economy.
The literature on extraction industries provided insightful knowledge. Developing
economies need a sustainable economic growth to decrease poverty and to advance
public capital. However, resource-led development is not sustainable since it depletes the
natural resources. Also, as mentioned above, overdependence on one industry is highly
precarious. Additionally, countries with a limited ability to control all parts of
government administration are at risk of an increase in corruption.
The existing scholarly work on development, Chinese foreign direct investment,
and extraction industries provided great insight into how resource-rich countries develop.
The knowledge drawn from the review will contextualize Mongolia’s current
development.
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CHAPTER III: HISTORY OF MONGOLIA SINCE 1990
Background information
In 1990, Mongolia peacefully transitioned from seven decades of socialism to
democracy. The transition was internationally praised for the absence of violence and
commended for its swift transition after the fall of Soviet Union. The democratic
transition entailed significant political and economic reform. Politically, Mongolia
decentralized from a one party system to a multiparty parliamentary system. The Prime
Minister who is appointed by the President heads the government. Parliamentary
elections are based on a parallel voting system. Economically, Mongolia adopted a free
market economy where government plays a smaller role, and private companies
spearhead economic growth. The government quickly privatized state enterprises and
reformed tax policies to transition to the market economy.
Following the fall of the Soviet Union, Mongolia needed substantial aid to repair
the country’s economic, social and political structure. As a Soviet satellite state, the
Mongolian economy relied on the Soviet subsidies that totaled one-third of Mongolia's
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Wagner, 2012). After the evaporation of Soviet financial
support, Mongolia fell into a deep recession with high unemployment rate, and
widespread poverty. The newly formed democratic government turned to international
financial institutions like the World Bank (WB), Asian Development Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) for financial assistance. International aid came with a
conditional structural adjustment program that imposed implementation of neoliberal
policies like rapid privatization, a free market economy and the deregulation by the
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Mongolian government. The international lending institutions believed that the only path
for development was through an implementation of these neoliberal economic policies.
Until recently, the Mongolian economy was largely dependent on traditional
industries such as agriculture and herding. However, in the early 2000s, the Mongolian
mining industry experienced a dramatic boom after it discovered vast untapped reserves
of natural resources including gold, copper, high-quality coking coal, uranium, tin, and
iron. In 2009, the government saw the opportunity to develop its mining industry and
invited foreign governments to invest in the untapped natural resources. The benefits of
foreign direct investment showed in the double-digit growth of the economy in 2011 and
2012 (“Mongolia”). The mining industry quickly became the primary contributor to the
GDP. According to United Nations Development Programme, Mongolian mining sector
is responsible for estimated 40% of government revenues as well as 80% of exports from
the country (“About Mongolia”). Although the profit from the mining industry has
encouraged economic growth, as I explored in my literature review, excessive
dependence on a single sector can be a problem to the economy. The overreliance on one
sector can expose the Mongolian economy to the unpredictable nature of commodity
price fluctuations.
As a landlocked country with limited transportation infrastructure, Mongolia faces
many challenges in developing efficient export industries. Located between the two of
the biggest markets, Russia and China, Mongolia’s export market is mainly limited to
these two countries. The implications of limited trading partners can have negative
consequence as economic and political change in either country can have a significant
effect on the Mongolian economy. For example, Figure 2 indicates GDP of Mongolia
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from 2013 to 2015. The economic slowdown in 2014 to 2015 is largely due to the
decrease in Chinese demand for Mongolian minerals.
Figure 2

Mongolian GDP Growth Rate (2009-2015)
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The relationship between China and Mongolia is complex. Over 200 years of
subjugation under Chinese rule has lead to mistrust of Chinese presence in the country.
However, the Mongolian economy is heavily dependent on China’s import of Mongolian
natural resources. The rapid industrialization of China created a unique opportunity for
Mongolia’s top export minerals such as copper ore and coal to China. Since 2004,
Mongolia has consistently exported over 95% of all production of both minerals to China.
According to 2014 data, China has purchased 99.5% of Mongolian copper ore and 99.8%
of its coal production. Collectively, Mongolia exported over $3 billion (over half of its
exports) worth of minerals to China in 2014. Consequently, the Mongolian economy is
heavily dependent on the Chinese demand for copper and coal (“Mongolian Export”).
The danger of depending on one market for economic growth was realized in the
years 2014 and 2015 when Chinese demand for Mongolian natural resources decreased.
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The decline in demand caused the Mongolian GDP growth rate to plummet from 17% in
2011 to 2.3% in 2015 (Bernard, 2016). The GDP growth rate continued to slow down, as
economists forecast the likelihood of a continual decrease due to diminishing Chinese
demand. On September 3, 2016, President Xi Jinping signed the Paris climate agreement
deal that promises to decrease emissions production in China by 2030. The commitment
did not include specific targets for China, however, the President pledged to curb their
emissions production by restricting the burning of fossil fuels. The Chinese commitment
is alarming to the Mongolian economy as China is their number one natural resource
export partner. Mongolian coal production depends on the Chinese demand for coal. If
China ceases to import Mongolian coal, the Mongolian economy will shrink
significantly. In order to avoid a further economic slump, the Mongolian government
needs to reform its export industries where it can avoid overreliance on one industry by
developing other export sectors such as agriculture and herding.
The Mongolian political environment has not been without a fair share of
controversy. Party fraction, corruption, nepotism and political instability have plagued
the country. Mongolian politics often experience turbulent parliamentary politics in the
State Ih Khural (the state assembly). The dominant parties are the Mongolian People’s
Party (MPP) (current ruling party), the Democratic Party (DP), and the Mongolian
People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP). The Mongolian electoral process is highly
contentious, and rules change frequently. At the beginning of the 2000s, the Mongolian
political environment started disintegrating due to internal disagreements. The Grand
Coalition formed in 2004 collapsed due to contention over party leadership. The collapse
of the coalition left the parliament without a clear majority, leaving it unable to function.
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In response, 25 members of the DP switched party to join the MPRP, declaring it the
ruling party. Some citizens, as well as other parliamentary members, denounced the
controversial move. However, it did help overcome a government impasse. The
compromise did not last long, as the parliament again went through major political
upheaval in 2008.
The political dysfunction continued in 2008 as a controversial parliamentary
election took place. Scandals involving voter fraud questioned the election result that
declared MPRP as the ruling party. On July 1, 2008, peaceful protestors gathered to
oppose the election results in the streets of Sukhbaatar square. The peaceful rally quickly
turned into a violent riot as a group of people threw rocks and set fires to the MPRP
headquarters and the Cultural Museum Building beside it. In the end, five people died,
and hundreds were injured. The government called its first-ever state of emergency that
lasted four days (“Mongolia calls state of emergency,” 2008).
Another political controversy followed the next election in 2012, over the arrest
of the former president Enkhbayar Nambar (MPRP) on allegations of corruption and
nepotism. The international community widely condemned the April 13th, 2012, arrest
procedure and the accusation of the former president for violating fundamental human
rights (“Amnesty International Public Statement”). Amnesty International criticized the
lack of due process and the treatment of Mr. Nambar following his arrest. The supporters
of Mr. Nambar claimed that the motivation to charge him was to exclude him from the
upcoming parliamentary election (Levin, 2012). The Ulaanbaatar district court convicted
Mr. Nambar of corruption, embezzlement, and misappropriation of government
properties. The initial court sentence was seven years in prison, and a monetary fine but
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Mr. Nambar spent less than a month in prison and was transferred to a private hospital to
finish off his sentence. However, on August 1, 2013, President Elbegdorj Tsakhia
pardoned Mr.Nambar and released him from his convictions (Erkhes, 2013).
Throughout the political upheaval, the Mongolian civil society played a
significant role in voicing discontent over government incompetence in dealing with a
stagnant economy, unemployment, inequality and most of all, corruption. According to
2015 Transparency International corruption index, Mongolia scored 39 out of 100,
indicating rampant corruption in the public and private sector (Transparency
International). A survey conducted by the Asia Foundation in June 2015 found that 59%
of the respondents believed that corruption has increased from previous years and think it
will continue to grow in the coming years (Nara, 2015). In 2006, the Independent
Authority Against Corruption (IAAC) was established to fight against corruption and
bribery. Under the attorney general, the IAAC has the power to investigate public
officials and private businesses and refer appropriate cases to the General Prosecutor’s
office (“IAAC”).
Although the IAAC has made significant strides in combatting the ubiquitous
corruption, international communities like Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe
and Central Asia (ACN) believe stronger measures can be taken to prevent and fight
corruption. Critics believe that the current criminal law of Mongolia does not meet the
standard of the international criminalization of corrupt practices and appropriate
enforcement is lacking in serious corruption cases. Additionally, political party financing
is often unregulated. Nepotism and bribery also plague the Judiciary organ (“AntiCorruption Reforms in Mongolia,” 2015).
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According to Transparency International’s most recent data, in 2013, 65% of
Mongolians that were surveyed felt political parties were corrupt. Similarly, 73% of the
interviewees felt that judiciary was "extremely" corrupt (Transparency International).
Civil society organizations agree that to achieve true economic and social equality, a
culture of transparency and accountability must be created at all levels of government,
and in the judicial and executive sectors.
In the last two decades, Mongolian society has experienced major social
transformation. As a Soviet satellite, Mongolian people’s social standing was relatively
equal. Although the country was experiencing a significant shortage of food and relied on
the Soviet Union for most of the county’s nutritional needs, Mongolians had universal
health care and education. Additionally, the centrally planned economy provided jobs to
the people and kept the unemployment rate low. Following democratization in 1990,
citizens had high hope of an increase in the living standards. However, achieving
development through a free market economy proved to be a challenge. According to July
2016 data, the Mongolian unemployment rate is at 10.4%, indicating a higher rate than
the previous three years.
Additionally, the 2016 survey from Mongolian NGO Sant Maral Foundation
reported that citizens’ primary concern was unemployment (36% of responders) and
number two was standards of living/poverty/income with 15.1% (Sant Maral Foundation,
2015). Regional disparity is also apparent. Urban dwellers have better access to social
programs than the pastoral herders who live far from cities and have limited access to
resources. Also, 55.9% of the respondents answered that the government fails to solve the
most urgent problem “always” and 28.1% responded the government failed to solve them
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“often.” A staggering 84% of the respondents felt that the government is incompetent in
addressing the country’s most pressing social issues.
In Mongolia, access to quality health and education is unequal. The Mongolian
literacy rate is 98% for both men and women. Compulsory primary education has been
beneficial for literacy rate of the country. However, secondary education has an unequal
attendance. Despite high literacy rate, there are disparities in access to quality education.
According to Mongolia’s 2016 Human Development report, access to education among
disabled youth is significantly lower. The study reveal that estimated only 66.2% of
youth with disabilities are enrolled in compulsory education (Mongolia Human
Development Report, 2016). Urban residents are more likely to continue education and
attend secondary education than the rural residents. The increasingly high cost of living
and housing deters rural residents from attending school (Mongolia Human Development
Report, 2016). Following democratization, private education became highly sought out in
Mongolia. Parents are encouraged to send their children to private school with better
education curricula. However, urban residents are more likely to be able to afford better
education than the poor rural residents.
Similarly, in the health sector, most of the population depends on national health
care. As a Soviet satellite, Mongolia benefited from modern medicine for disease control
and prevention. The decentralization of the government has lead to private and public
partnership health care reform. The World Health Organization’s 2013 analysis indicated
that instability in the government set back the improvement of the health care system.
Changes in ruling parties often make the process of meaningful health care reform slow
and ineffective. Additionally, the quality of health care can vary in urban to rural areas.
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Urban residents have better options for health care, as hospitals are easily accessible in
the capital city. Rural residents have either one hospital in the nearest town, or a limited
number of doctors that visit from town to town. Also, a person’s income level can
determine whether they can afford to go to private hospitals for better and faster care.
According to most recent data, in 2014, the Mongolian poverty rate was 21.6%
(UNDPMN). However, a sharp increase in the poverty rate is expected as GDP growth
rate decreased to a single digit in 2015 and continued to drop in early 2016. Additionally,
in the most recent data on income inequality, by 2012, the richest 20% of the population
held 41.66% of the national income, while the bottom 20% held 7.6% of the national
income. The inequality gap continues to widen as the economy continues to slow down.
The capital city, Ulaanbaatar, is home to an estimated 1.38 million people out of
the total Mongolian population of 3.02 million people. A significant number of
individuals have moved from the rural areas to live in the capital city in search of jobs
and better life opportunity. As of 2015, 72.5 % of the population is living in the capital
city (the World Bank). Traditional herders are unable to sustain rural life as extreme
weather conditions in the winter and desertification threatens the sustainability of their
traditional lifestyle. During harsh winters, thousands to a million livestock can perish due
to extreme cold or starvation. The herders are also facing desertification as lands become
increasingly arid due to climate change and human-made factors (BBC, 2016).
Unfortunately, government-housing organizations are not able to provide
adequate shelter to the flood of the newcomers, forcing them to create ger (yurt) slums
surrounding the metropolis. Within few miles of the developing capital lie the slum
dwellers that live without proper access to health, sanitation, education and employment
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opportunity. The conditions in the ger slums can get extremely dire during the winters
where the temperature could fall as low as -40 Celsius. Due to the extreme cold,
residents are forced to burn coal for warmth and cooking which significantly intensifies
the existing air pollution. Pollution levels can go up to a hazardous level where it is 6-7
times higher than the World Health Organization (WHO) standards (WB, 2012).
Consequently, the population is vulnerable to many respiratory illnesses, lung cancer and
in some extreme cases, spontaneous abortion.
Mongolia is at a crossroads. Economically, the country is suffering from a
recession due to a slowing of economic growth. Socially, the persistence of high
unemployment rate continues to concern the citizens. Politically, the instability in the
parliament decreases the functionality of the government. The notable exception is that
civil society continues to practice its democratic rights and demonstrate its dissatisfaction
through electoral participation and public demonstrations. Mongolian voter turnout in a
parliamentary and presidential election is estimated at 70%. Additionally, many NGOs
continue to fight for social wellbeing. In a historic 2016 parliamentary election, 85% of
the vote went to the opposition party MPP that took 65 of the 76 seats in the parliament.
The citizens openly voiced their discontent with the ruling DP on how it mismanaged
economic policies and their lack of competence in addressing social problems. The new
ruling party has the unique opportunity to establish stability in the government and to
promote foreign investment that encourages multiple export sectors without over-relying
on mining industries. Additionally, fiscal discipline is required to curb national spending
and allocate resources for societal wellbeing. Much faith is placed on the new
government to address the most urgent problems of society.
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The background information provided a broad overview of the Mongolian
society. Since 1990, Mongolia has achieved great success in poverty reduction and
democratic representation of the people. However, there are still problems concerning
even development. The following section contains the case study to answer the research
questions. The case study will provide an answer to whether extraction-led development
can lead to development.

32

CHAPTER IV. Methodology
This thesis engages in a comparative case study to investigate the promise and
pitfalls of FDI in creating development, using Mongolia as a case study. The research
questions encompasses series of interrelated inquiries including 1) whether human
development can be achieved through extraction industries 2) whether the source of FDI
has a strong impact on development outcomes, and 3) whether FDI influences state-led
development efforts and decision making to the extent that it threatens the development
of Mongolian sovereignty
The principle research methodologies utilize qualitative and quantitative analysis
of primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include contract agreements,
Mongolian mining laws and legislation, government and independent investigator
reports, official public complaints, data collected from the World Bank, the government
of Mongolia, and independent arbiter decisions. Secondary sources include news reports
and academic journals addressing Mongolian foreign investment, extraction industry,
social and environmental concerns, corruption, political instability and economic
development.
In order to assess whether foreign investment in the extraction industries has
contributed to the development of Mongolia and to evaluate whether differences in
foreign investor affect the impact of the investment, my comparative case study analyzes
two prominent mines. In order to measure the impacts of the investments, the two mines
are analyzed by their contribution to Mongolia’s (1) political environment, (2) economic
growth, (3) societal progress and (4) environmental sustainability. Also, to address the
second research question, the foreign investors are evaluated based on their business
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conduct. The foreign investors will be examined by their regulatory compliance and
corporate social responsibility.
The first section will identify the two foreign invested mining operations in my
case study. The second section will analyze the impact of both mines on Mongolian
development, and their relationship to the Mongolian government’s enforcement efforts.
The final section will include concluding analysis and address the research questions.
The two mines were selected based on their significant contribution to the
Mongolian GDP. As discussed in the background information, Mongolia’s export sector
relies heavily on the international demand for its two major natural resources: copper and
coal. The Oyu Tolgoi (hereafter OT) is Mongolia’s biggest mine extracting copper, gold,
and ore. However, copper is the principal natural resource for extraction. So far, mining
giant Rio Tinto and Ivanhoe Mines together invested $6.6 billion to develop OT’s open
pit (Els, 2014). In May 2016, the Mongolian government and the investors signed off on
a $5.3 billion investment to further development of OT’s underground pit. With the
development of the underground pit, revenues are expected to significantly increase
revenues for both parties ("Rio Tinto approves the development of Oyu Tolgoi
underground mine," 2016).
The Khushuut mine is the second largest coal deposit in Mongolia.1 The Khusuut
mine is under 100% ownership of the Chinese mineral and energy exploration company,
Mongolia Energy Corporation (MEC). The Khushuut’s production supplies Xinjiang’s
rapid industrialization that demands quality-coking coal for steel production (Daily
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The largest coalmine, Tavan Tolgoi is eliminated due to its beginning exploration stage
as of 2016. There are not enough data available to evaluate the mine’s operation.
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China, 2008). The Khushuut mine is expected to produce 3 to 8 million tons of coking
coal each year for the Xinjiang coal market.
Additionally, the two mines extract two different natural resources. The OT
deposit’s primary mineral is copper. Copper is an essential mineral for infrastructure
development. Although the copper market is historically unstable, prices can soar with
the increase in demand. The recent rapid Chinese industrialization increased the demand
of copper, making copper production profitable. Therefore, Mongolia has been supplying
more than 99% of its copper production to China for the last ten years (The Observatory
of Economic Complexity, n.d.).
The Khushuut’s deposit is rich with coal. Independent researchers revealed that
Khushuut contains premium quality coking coal (Mining Technology, n.d.). Historically,
the coal market is stable, and prices are low. Most developing countries rely on the
affordable nature of coal for power generation and industrialization. Therefore, the
demand for coal remains constant (World Coal Association, n.d.). Transportation costs
also affect market price. Khushuut is located only 310km from the Yarany Border of
Xinjiang, China where coal demand is high. Over the past five years, over 99% of
Mongolia’s coal was exported to China (The Observatory of Economic Complexity,
n.d.). The map in Figure 3 illustrates locations of the two mines.
In order to address the second research question, the mines were selected based on
their difference in foreign investors. The comparative analysis is to evaluate how the
difference in national origin of mine of ownership impact Mongolia’s development. As
discussed in the literature review, Chinese foreign investments have a particular pattern
when it comes to natural resources. Therefore, I chose to conduct a comparative analysis
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of Chinese-owned Khushuut coalmine, and Anglo-Australian owned OT copper mine.
The comparative analysis will reveal whether the pattern of Chinese foreign investment
holds in Mongolia and reveal if there are significant differences in Chinese businesses’
conduct towards the government when compared to Anglo-Australian investors.
Figure 3

KHUSHUUT



Source: NPR (Langfitt)
The Khushuut Coal Mine is owned and operated by a Chinese mining and energy
investment holding company, Mongolian Energy Corporation (MEC). The mine is
located in Khovd province in the Western Mongolia. The Khushuut mine is
approximately 190 miles from the Chinese Yarant Border Station. The MEC began its
acquisition of 330,000 hectares of the mining area in 2007 with the intent to explore and
mine coal from the open pit mine (Daily China, 2008). In addition to the Khushuut mine,
MEC is also owner and operator of mines located in Olon bulag and Bayan Ulgii
provinces of Western Mongolia. The Khushuut mine is considered the second largest coal
deposit in Mongolia, following Tavan Tolgoi coking coal mine.
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Prior to its natural resource investments, MEC was a property investment and a
private jet service corporation called the New World CyberBase Limited
(NWCB)(Mongolia Energy Corporation, 2007). In 2007, the company changed course to
invest in mining coal and ferrous and non-ferrous metals resource in Western Mongolia
and Xinjiang, China. Figure 4 illustrates the structure of the MEC. The MEC began its
exploration of the Khushuut mine in 2006 and commenced extraction in 2008. Although
the MEC is a multiple license holder of mines in Western Mongolia, the contracts are not
publically available. The most recent contract available to the public is the renegotiation
of terms in 2014. The contract is between the local government of the Khovd province
and the MEC subsidiary MoEnCo LLC. The duration of the agreement is for three years,
from February 2014 to December 2016 (Mongolia Energy Corporation, 2014).
At the inception of the Khushuut mine development, the MEC contracted mining
consultant John T.Boyd Company to determine the future output of the mine. The
investigation determined that the Khushuut mine has a coal deposit of 460 million tons
and 141 million tons were considered premium-coking coal. Additionally, the Khushuut
mine’s estimated lifespan is 19 years (Boyd, 2009). Currently, the MEC has eight
licensing rights to mine Khushuut with a 100% share of the Khushuut mine. The MEC is
required to pay local and government taxes as well as license royalties. By 2008, the
Khushuut mine became operational with the extraction goal of 3 million ton of premium
coal per year. In 2010, the MEC created a long-term coal supply contract with Baosteel
Bayi. Under the contract, the MEC agreed to provide at least 9.6 million to 10 million
tons from the year 2010 to 2020 (Mongolian Energy Corporation, 2010).
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The OT is one of the world’s largest copper, gold and ore mines located in
Omnogovi province within South Gobi, Mongolia. The OT is estimated to be the biggest
copper deposit in the world. The development of the OT has been in exploration since the
1990s, but the growth possibilities were not apparent until 2001 when Canadian Ivanhoe
Mines became involved. In 2009, Ivanhoe Mines and Rio Tinto merged to form
Turquoise Hill Resources and formed a cooperation agreement with the Mongolian
government. Turquoise Hill Resources owns 66%, and the Mongolian government owns
the remaining 34% of the mine. Within Turquoise Hill Resources, Rio Tinto controls
51% of the share making it the manager of the OT (Jamasmie, 2012). Figure 5 illustrates
the structure of the OT ownership.
Figure 4

Figure 5
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On October 9th, 2009, all parties signed the cooperation contract. It is valid for 30
years with the possibility of additional 20-year renewal. However, Turquoise Hill
Resources must abide by all provisions of the agreement during the initial 30 years for

38

contract renewal (Oyu Tolgoi LLC, 2009). Rio Tinto estimated that the OT's reserves
could produce 1.2 billion pounds of copper and 650,000 ounces of gold yearly over a
lifespan of 50 years (Els, 2013). The OT became operational by March 2010 and started
its extraction of copper, ore, and gold.
Limitations and Further Research Questions
This research’s goal is to find out the impact of the mining boom in Mongolia’s
development. The case study selected two prominent mines operating in Mongolia to
conclude results. However, there are limitations. The methodology is limited to assessing
primary and secondary sources available through websites and academic journals. The
case study lacks on the ground research in Mongolia.
The case study analyzed two mines that have been operational for six years.
Further research is required to find out long-term effect of the extraction industry on the
Mongolian development. Given time, more data will be available to assess the broader
impact of the mining boom.
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CHAPTER IV: Case Study
Regulatory Compliance of Khushuut and Oyu Tolgoi
The Mongolian President Elbegdorj Tsakhia has been a proponent of foreign
direct investment to grow Mongolia’s economy. In the early 2000s, Mongolia’s mining
boom attracted numerous foreign investors to take part in the natural wealth. The foreign
attraction has encouraged the government to pass various mineral laws both to regulate
and to promote foreign investment.
In 2007, the Parliament implemented a significant mineral law to take control of
the natural resources. Under the “Strategic Importance” law, a mineral deposit that may
have potential impact on national security, economic and social development of the
country at regional or national levels, or has the capability of producing greater than 5%
of the GDP in a single year, it is identified as a mine of “Strategic Importance.” If a
mineral deposit qualifies for any of the characteristics, the state government must have a
certain amount of shares in the mineral deposit (Mongolian Mining Law, 2006). Under
the said mineral law, Article 5.4 indicates that the state may hold up to 50% of the shares
if state funds are applied for the exploration of mineral reserves. Additionally, Article 5.5
states that the state may own up to 34% of the shares of the investment if the mine is
determined to be of “strategic importance” and the exploration of mineral reserves were
not funded by the state budget. The amount of investment determines the percentage
share (Mongolian Mineral Law, 2006). In the event of a “Strategic Importance” ruling,
the license holder and the government will negotiate government participation in
production and profit sharing.
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The Khushuut mine was not classified as a mineral deposit of “Strategic
Importance” at the beginning of the operation. However, on December 6, 2012, the
Mining Ministry of Mongolia requested information on the Khushuut mine to assess its
qualification on strategic importance. In June 2013, the Government of Mongolia (GOM)
announced its intent to add the Khushuut coal mine to the list of mineral deposits of
“Strategic Importance” (Mongolian Energy Corporation “Annual Report,” 2014. pg 91).
The parliament declared that the Khushuut mine contributes significant economic and
social development to the country. The Khushuut mine was estimated to bring 2,514.4
billion tukrig to local and national development through royalties, taxes, and fees.
Additionally, the Khushuut mine’s transport infrastructure, power transmission line,
power plants, industrial buildings, communication system and industrial water supply
network all have a social impact on the development of Khovd province. Therefore, the
Parliament believed that the Khushuut mine should be included under the “Strategic
Importance” category. In the same month, the Khushuut mine stopped its operation to
deliberate with the government. During the halt in operation, over half of the 500 staff
became temporarily out of work. On March 31, 2014, the GOM decided to exclude the
Khushuut mine from the “strategic importance” list because the government stated that
the economic benefit from resuming the mine operation is valuable, and the government
wished the mine to resume operation to generate revenue.
In July 2009, the GOM adopted the “Mining Prohibition Law” to address
environmental protection concerns. The law prohibits mineral exploration and extraction
in areas of headwaters of rivers and lakes and forested areas. Additionally, any previously
granted licensed that overlap the prohibited areas will be terminated within five months
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of the implementation of the law. In 2015, the government passed an amendment to the
law and added a clause for the license holder to continue to operate in said prohibited
areas if the license holder takes appropriate measure to restore the environment. The
license holder must submit a request to continue its operation in prohibited areas to the
Mongolian Ministry of Environment, Green Development and Tourism within three
months from the effective date. The licenses can be revoked if said obligations are not
met (Lovells, 2015).
In 2014, the government identified four mining concessions in the Khushuut mine
that overlapped the prohibited areas: license number 2913A, 4322A, 11888A and
15289A. The Khushuut mine continued to operate in the mining areas due to an unclear
boundary definition of the prohibited areas. The MEC stated that they should continue to
mine in the specified areas until licenses are revoked, and in the event of revocation of
license, the MEC determined that GOM should pay compensation to the MEC (Mongolia
Energy Corporation “Annual Report”, 2014. Pg 91). As of November 2016, three of the
four mines identified as overlapping prohibited areas continue to be operational.
The OT agreement was signed in October 2009 and entered into force in March
2010. On September 2011, 20 members of the Mongolian parliament petitioned the
government to increase the government share in Turquoise Hill from 34% to 50%. The
petition came ahead of Mongolia’s parliamentary election for June 2012 (Stanway,
2011). According to the cooperation agreement of 2009, contract terms can be
renegotiated between the parties only when the initial 30-year contract term expires.
Turquoise Hill Resources requested that the government honor the agreement.
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In June 2011, the GOM passed Resolution 175, which stated certain land areas are
for “state special needs.” The indicated areas are to be used for infrastructure facilities.
As of June 2011, the GOM passed Resolution 175, which stated certain land areas are for
“state special needs.” The indicated areas are to be used for infrastructure facilities. As of
2011, some areas identified, as “state special needs” are under exploration and mining
license of the OT. Turquoise Hill Resources indicated that infrastructure developed in
some areas might adversely affect the mining and exploration process. The GOM claimed
that if the infrastructure adversely affects the progress of OT; the GOM will be
responsible for compensation.
The intent to renegotiate the share dividends was raised again in October 2012.
The deliberation of the shareholders continued into 2013 (Kosich, 2012). In addition to
the disagreement, Turquoise Hill Resources voiced concerns about the uncertainty
regarding the approval process and timing required to resolve the complex outstanding
issues. The unresolved issues create uncertainty about the mine’s future and slow down
the development process.
In 2013, the Government of Mongolia proposed a budget that included additional
royalty revenue from the OT. However, the 2009 OT agreement clearly indicates that the
royalty rate is capped at 5% throughout the duration of the contract. Also, new laws
regarding royalties made after the agreement will not apply to the OT. Turquoise Hill
Resources claimed that any change in royalty fees requires approval from all parties
involved in the contract (Entrée Gold Inc., 2013, pg. 6).
In August 2013, the production of OT was delayed to resolve outstanding issues
concerning development and operation of OT and its project financing. The GOM stated
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that the parliament must approve the project funding. The OT temporarily halted
production until the financial matters were resolved. On May 18, 2015, the Turquoise
Hill Resources and GOM reinforced Investment Agreement and the Amended and
Restated Shareholders Agreement (ARSHA) (("Amended and Restated Shareholders'
Agreement," 2011). The agreement resolved outstanding issues from prior years and
agreed on project funding.
In the comparative analysis of the two mines, the OT investors, Rio Tinto and
Ivanhoe are clearly well-established investors with a lot of experience investing in
foreign mines. The Khushuut mine owner, the MEC is a new company that started in the
mineral exploration business in 2007. The Turquoise Hill Resources has a clear and
transparent method for publishing the contract agreement, independent investor’s report,
worker safety procedures and various documents related to the operation of the mine.
However, there is a clear lack of accessible documents from the MEC. The company puts
out yearly financial reports but the information provided does not adequately include the
citizen’s complaints and the effort it took to address the concerns.
The analysis of both mines’ regulatory compliance shows that the Mongolian
government’s instability is a big hindrance factor to the development effort of both
mines. Since 2009, the Mongolian government passed various laws addressing economic,
social and environmental concerns. On the one hand, due to the demands from civil
society, the government passed legislation to ensure economic benefit is ensured at the
national as well as the provincial level. On the other hand, the laws passed became
increasingly conservative, making it hard for the foreign investors to purchase licensing
rights and provided stricter guidelines for shared dividends.
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The increasingly restrictive laws have had a discouraging effect on foreign
investment. Many foreign investors criticized that the uncertainty of future regulatory
system has decreased investor confidence in the country. The investment share
disagreement between the Mongolian government and Turquoise Hill Resources caused a
temporary halt in the production, which cost revenue for both parties. Similarly, the
Mongolian government and the MEC disagreed over enforcing “Strategic Importance”
law to the Khushuut mine. However, these actions were the Mongolian government’s
effort to manage the foreign investors and to protect the national interest of Mongolia.
The regulatory compliance analysis yields larger implications for Mongolia’s
political environment. First, the failure to include the Khushuut mine to the “Strategic
Importance” category indicates the MEC’s blatant disregard for the Mongolian law. The
MEC was able to exhort economic dominance over the Mongolian law to ensure 100%
ownership of the mine. But most importantly, the inability of the Mongolian government
to enforce its law indicates the larger issue of “state erosion.” The government of
Mongolia’s inability to enforce its own national law indicates a weak institution.
Second, the majority of the conservative laws and its stronger effort of
enforcement are due to citizen’s demand. As demonstrated in the June 2016 election,
civil society has the power to influence parliamentary elections. The Mongolian
government’s reaction to the citizens’ demands resulted in drafting stronger measures to
enforce environmental protection, local level economic benefits and stronger regulations
in foreign investment practices. Although there are instances of failure to enforce some of
the regulations, the government is receptive to the demands of the people. Therefore, the
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relationship between the government and the people has the political impact of “state
building.”
Oyu Tolgoi and Khushuut’s Economic Impact on the Mongolian Economy
The most important part of foreign investment is its contribution to the host
country’s economic growth. Under the Mineral Law of Mongolia, 20% of extraction
industry royalties go to the host province government and 10% is given to the local
district government (Mineral Law of Mongolia, 2006). The fees provide financial
assistance to developing regional social and economic infrastructure. Mongolian mining
legislation requires foreign investors to sign “local-level agreements” where local civil
society and community groups voice their interest in hosting mining explorations. The
goal of the regulation is to contribute to the local economy of the host province directly.
The MEC signed such an agreement with the Khovd province in 2014. Under the
contract, the MEC is required to contribute to local economic development by contracting
50% of the goods and services related to the mine from the local companies.
Additionally, the MEC is required to invest US$0.6 (60 cents) per each ton of coal if
exported coal is over 100,000 tons to the Khovd Khushuut Development Fund
("Cooperation Agreement Between Khovd Aimag and MOENCO LLC," 2014). Also, the
government generates revenue through taxes and royalties. A similar contract was signed
with Turquoise Hill Resources over the OT production. The GOM gains economic
benefit through taxes, license royalties, share dividends, and local business contracts
("Oyu Tolgoi Investment Agreement - Turquoise Hill Resources," 2009).
The economic impact of foreign investors in Mongolia is apparent in the years
2010 and 2011 (Figure 2) (“Mongolian GDP”). The GDP rate grew to extraordinary
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double digits during these years. In 2010 both of the mines made significant deals with
Chinese businesses to sell coal and copper respectively. The MEC created a long-term
coal supply contract with Baosteel Bayi and promised to provide an estimated 10 million
tons of coal by 2020 (Asia Miner, 2010). Similarly, Turquoise Hill Resources committed
to two large Chinese smelters to export an undisclosed sum of ore. The mining industry
became one of the top contributors to the GDP growth. In 2013, Mongolian National
University and Australian economist Brian Fisher estimated that by 2020, revenue from
OT would represent more than one-third of the Mongolian economy (Economist, 2012).
According to data from 2010 to 2016, mining, agriculture and the service sectors
are the biggest contributors to Mongolia’s GDP. As shown in Figure 6, the mining and
service sectors outperformed the agriculture industry (Trading Economics, n.d.). The
slight decrease in the mining profit was caused by the separate disagreement between the
OT and the Khushuut mine with the GOM. The growth in the mining industry
significantly contributes to the service sector, as the service sector benefitted from the
business opportunities stimulated by the mining boom. The variance between the revenue
from mining and the service industry can be attributed to the high unemployment rate in
2016.
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Figure 6
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The Khushuut mine’s profit margins are significantly lower than OT’s profit
margins (Rio Tinto, n.d.). The decline in the Chinese market demand for coal affected the
MEC profit. Since coal prices are significantly lower than copper prices, the OT’s
revenue is much higher. Also, Turquoise Hill Resources conducts a more transparent
operation than the MEC, and yet it yields a higher profit. The OT operation shows that
transparency and profit can go hand in hand.
The production size of the Khushuut mine is smaller than OT. Turquoise Hill
Resources invested estimated $6.4 billion in developing the OT. The full investment
efforts of the Turquoise Hill Resources reaffirm the commitment of Turquoise Hill
Resources to the OT.
According to Rio Tinto data, OT project development brought an estimated
US$1.4 billion revenue to the Mongolian government through taxes and fees (Rio Tinto,
n.d.). Since the production began in 2010 for both mines, the national poverty rate has
declined steadily. According to the World Bank data, since 2010, the national poverty
rate dropped from 38.8% to 21.6% by 2014 (Table 1)(World Bank, 2015). While the
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decline of national poverty is a sign of societal progress, there are disparities between the
urban and rural residents. According to the Asia Foundation, rural residents have a
greater poverty rate than urban residents (Theunissen, 2014). Rural residents have fewer
employment opportunities, as the traditional herding lifestyle is no longer sustainable.
Many rural residents lack access to quality education and skills training.

National Average
Urban
Rural
Region
Western
Khangai/Highlands
Central
Eastern
Ulaanbaatar
Source: World Bank

Table 1. Mongolian Poverty Rate
2010
2011
2012
38.8%
33.7%
27.4%
33.2%
28.7%
23.3%
49.0%
43.2%
35.4%

2014
21.6%
18.8%
26.4%

52.7%
51.9%
29.9%
43.3%
31.2%

26.0%
25.3%
22.2%
31.4%
16.4%

40.5%
49.1%
28.1%
40.0%
25.8%

32.3%
38.5%
28.2%
33.4%
19.9%

The increase in foreign investment began in the mid-2000s. The mining boom
attracted many foreign investors and with that, the promise of job creation. Both of the
mines’ agreements indicate specific provisions that require employment of a certain
percentage of Mongolian nationals. The OT is obliged to have at least 90% of employees
be Mongolian, and the Khushuut mine requires at least 70% Mongolian citizens comprise
the mine workforce. These provisions secure employment opportunities, but do not seem
to have a positive effect on the employment rate. In August 2013, the Turquoise Hill
Resources fired 1700 employees due to the disagreement with the GOM over the division
of the mining revenue (Santhebennur, 2013). Its production has contracted, and so has its
workforce.
2011 and 2012 were the years when the Mongolian GDP experienced a doubledigit growth rate. The graph in Figure 7 indicates the increase in the unemployment rate
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in 2012, rather than decrease in the unemployment rate. According to foreign investment
proponents, increase in economic growth will improve business opportunities and create
more jobs. On the contrary, the unemployment data from 2007 to 2016 indicates that the
unemployment rate is the highest it has been in the last ten years (Trading Economics,
n.d.).
Figure 7

Source: Trading Economics
My analysis of the economic impact suggests that the Mongolian economy
benefited greatly from the mining boom for approximately three years. The decrease in
the national poverty rate due to economic growth is a notable success towards social
progress. However, inclusive growth has been difficult to achieve. The results show that
rural residents are reported to live under much higher poverty rate than the urban dwellers
(World Bank, 2015). According to the 2014 data, one in four people live in poverty in
urban areas versus one in three people in rural areas.
The GDP growth can be attributed to the attraction of foreign investors in the
extraction industry during the mining boom. The large profit margins from natural
resources led the Mongolian government to prioritize extraction-led development.
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The case study suggests that the Chinese demand for coal and Mongolian
economic growth is positively correlated. The increase in the Chinese market demand for
copper and coal increases the growth of the Mongolian economy. Accordingly, the
decrease in Chinese demand can slow down the Mongolian economic growth. The GDP
data from 2014 to 2016 proves the deduction. As indicated in the economic performance,
the Chinese demand for such natural resources steadily declined in 2014 and plummeted
in 2015 due to Chinese economic growth contraction, and as a consequence, the
Mongolian GDP sharply decreased.
The data from 2015 and 2016 demonstrate that single industry reliance is
extremely volatile. The revenue from extraction industry can vary with any change in
either the commodity price or the international political environment. My analysis
indicates that the current Chinese effort to utilize alternative energy sources to coal would
have a detrimental effect on Mongolia’s export sector.
Furthermore, a focus on extraction-led development neglects the development of
other exportable sectors of the economy. The data on sectors that contribute to the GDP
indicates that the agriculture failed to develop in a meaningful way in the last five years.
Social Impact: Civil Society in Action
Foreign investment can bring opportunities for social development. Especially in
a developing country, the infusion of infrastructure, technology, and skills training
resources, bring a significant opportunity for progress. Both mines contributed to the
infrastructural development of their host provinces. In 2011, Turquoise Hill Resources
began its construction of electrical lines for OT development and the local community.
The power source is connected to China’s power source (Mining.com, 2011). The
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construction of electric power replaced the community’s traditional means of dieselgenerated electricity. The introduction of a new source of energy is far more reliable and
delivered at a lower cost than the previous source. Additionally, it provides a more
efficient form of energy that leads to emissions reduction.
In 2010, the Turquoise Hill Resources constructed 97km of paved road from the
OT mine to the Mongolia-China border. The local community can utilize the road, but
under the agreement, the Turquoise Hill Resources can impose toll fees at any time. In
2011, a domestic airport was built as transportation infrastructure. Additionally, as a
worker safety measure, the OT provides housing for workers who qualify for assistance.
In November 2016, a hospital financed by Turquoise Hill Resources opened in order to
tend to the local and worker’s health needs (Oyu Tolgoi, 2016).
Under the 2009 Agreement between the GOM and Turquoise Hill Resources,
90% of the mine staff must be Mongolian nationals. Hence, the contract secured
employment opportunities for the residents. As of May 2016, an estimated 95% of 3000
employees were Mongolian citizens (Rio Tinto, 2016). However, in the same year,
Mongolian national unemployment rate has been at its highest in the last decade.
During the development and expansion of the OT, the herding community of
Gobi raised important issues concerned with the OT’s social impact. Their complaints
included displacement of local herders from their land, disruption of seasonal migration
routes, and limiting access to grazing land and other natural resources required to sustain
a traditional livelihood. In October 2012, a community of herders delivered a complaint
to World Bank’s International Finance Corporation (IFC) and Multilateral Insurance
Guarantee Agency (Mines and Communities, 2012). The complaint stated that adequate
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compensation should be provided to the displaced herders whose livelihood is
endangered by the Turquoise Hill project. However, the herders claimed that the
compensation provided was not appropriate to sustain their traditional way of life. The
monetary compensation given so far is a temporary concession that does not solve longterm issues. The herders demand access to grazing areas for their livestock and access to
water supply in order to survive. Land and water are especially scarce in the Gobi desert
and with the OT projects, resources are dwindling for the locals.
The community relations between the Khushuut mine owners and the local
community has been contested from the start. In 2010, a 14-year-old boy fell into a
Khushuut mine’s unsecured pit filled with water and drowned while playing around the
mine. The family brought a complaint to the MEC, but the MEC accepted no fault. The
MEC responded that the death was in an accident and is not the responsibility of the
MEC. The MEC did not offer any compensation, and the case was not pursued further
(Shuurhai, 2011). Henceforth, the MEC gained notoriety among the local people.
The community voiced its disapproval of the Chinese company’s 100%
ownership of one of the biggest mines in Mongolia. In 2012, the residents of Khovd
province wrote a letter to the President of Mongolia and his administration; voicing
community disapproval of the MEC’s 100% ownership of the Khushuut mine (VIP76,
2012). The letter indicated that 100% foreign ownership violates the Mongolian mining
law 4.1.12 of “strategic importance.” Although the 2012 government report noted that
the Khushuut deposit fits the characteristics of the “strategic importance” through its
economic contribution, it continues to be under full Chinese ownership. Additionally, the
community argued that the MEC failed to pay local taxes in the years 2011 and 2012.

53

Therefore, the community demanded that the government address the issue of “strategic
importance” and enforce the MEC to pay the required local taxes. In the event the GOM
does not adequately respond to the demands, the community threatened to close off the
Khushuut road that is used to transport coal to Xinjiang border (VIP76, 2012).
In 2012 the GOM initiated a process to include the Khushuut mine on the
“strategic importance” list. The Khushuut mine operation was temporarily put on hold
during the deliberation between the MEC and GOM through 2012 and 2013 (Mongolia
Energy Corporation, 2013). In the end, the GOM decided that the Khushuut mine would
not be listed as of “strategic importance.” The Mongolian people demand the GOM to
take control of the Khushuut mine, but the government responded that the economic
benefit from mine is valuable and any further disruption to the production will hurt the
economy. National and local sentiments indicate resentment of the government for giving
away country’s national resource wealth. Particularly in the Khovd province, at the local
town hall meetings, locals expressed their cynicism of the Khushuut mine’s contribution
to the Mongolian development (Shuurhai, 2012). The lack of control over country’s
national resources continues to the present day. In a 2016 national survey, 64.6% of the
subjects answered that the Mongolian government should own more than 51% of foreign
owner strategic mine deposits (Sant Maral Foundation, 2016). Furthermore, the
respondents responded that the benefit from the mineral wealth should focus on
improving economic development and focus on long-term social programs through
investment in education, health, etc.
The 2014 renegotiated contract included provisions that required the MEC to
contribute to local development. Under the 7.9 clause, the MEC is obligated to contribute
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to the development of Khovd by investing in education, healthcare, culture, sports,
tourism and the traditional herder lifestyle ("Cooperation Agreement Between Khovd
Aimag and MOENCO LLC,” 2014). The local administration is responsible for enforcing
the regulations. However, the many of the locals expressed their loss of their confidence
in the benefits of Khushuut mine (Shuurhai, 2012).
As a public infrastructure development, the MEC built a paved road to transport
coal to the Xinjiang Chinese-Mongolian border more efficiently. In May 2010, the MEC
contracted 700 Chinese nationals began the construction of the “Khushuut Road.” The
road was finished by November 2011 and became accessible to the community.
However, the locals were required to pay a toll fee to access the Khushuut road (Bolod,
n.d.).
In analyzing the social impact of both mines, the Mongolian civil society’s effort
to fight on behalf of the public is tremendously notable. The community is outspoken
against unjust investor conduct and often addresses the GOM to present the citizens’
concerns. Civil society pressured the Mongolian government to enforce the “Strategic
Importance” law to the Khushuut mine. Although it was unsuccessful, the Khovd
province government was able to renegotiate the contract with the MEC to include
provisions that required a contribution to the local development fund.
Environmental Impact: Preservation of Mongolian Traditional Livelihood
Extraction industries have a significant impact on the environment. Often, the
effects are detrimental to a sustainable environment. In 2009, the GOM passed the
Mining Prohibition law provided strict guidelines on protecting biodiversity and the
water resources of Mongolia. However, in January 2015, the GOM voiced its intention to
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weaken the environmental protection law to encourage more mining opportunities (Els,
2013; Woolley&Gulguu, 2015). Mongolian citizens responded with hunger strikes and
protests in the capital city. Thousands of citizens came to show support for the protest
and over 22,000 people signed a petition to demand that the President of Mongolia
protect Mongolia’s wildlife, ecology, and cultural heritage (Shourd & Rhoades, 2015).
Unfortunately, the presence of both mines has threatened the traditional herders’
way of life through environmental degradation and competition for natural resources.
Water management is crucial due to the location of the mine. In the Gobi desert, there is
low average precipitation. The OT project developed a bore field to help with water
supply and dust suppression. Also, the OT diverted the Undai River to accommodate
project facilities. On January 2nd, 2013 seven residents of Umnugobi contacted the
government to submit a legal complaint of the Undai River diversion project
(Compliance Advisor Ombudsman, 2013). The residents are local herders who stated that
the river diversion has a significant adverse effect on the traditional nomadic livelihood
and water supply in the arid land. The river diversion can dry up other water supplies that
stem from the Undai River, and can severely impact the already limited water supply for
livestock and forests. The complaint includes that Turquoise Hill Resources needs the
community and the government’s approval for the Undai River diversion. However,
Turquoise Hill Resources claimed that the river is on the territory licensed to the
Turquoise Hill and its flow is under a legal right to the license holder.
In 2015, the local government representatives, complainants, and Turquoise Hill
Resources were able to agree that it is Turquoise Hill Resources’ responsibility to reconstruct a spring that dried up due to the river diversion and provide water tanks to
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herders affected by the diversion. Additionally, Turquoise Hill Resources promised to
implement a water-monitoring system (A New Climate for Peace, n.d).
The contract between the Khushuut mine and the Khovd government included
provisions to that required the MEC to respect the environmental protection laws of the
land. The MEC implemented a project “Green Office Guideline” that closely monitors
the company’s mining and metal waste, plastic, and water recycling process. However,
the local community does not believe that the Khushuut mine adequately protects the
broader environment. The construction of the mine has increased dust storms in the area.
The frequent dust storms have a negative effect on the residents' and the livestock’s
health. The locals demand that the government enforce stricter environmental regulations,
but the government fails to address the issues properly. The Khovd residents fought to
add the Khushuut mine to the “strategic importance” mine list so that the government can
regulate and enforce environmental protection policies, but the GOM failed to take
control of the mine. The inability of the government to protect the rights of the people
left the community frustrated with the GOM.
In regards to environmental protection, both mines fail to adequately implement
policies that ensure corporate responsibility in addressing environmental degradation.
The community voiced concerns of competing for scarce water supply, limited grazing
land for livestock, poor air quality caused by raised dust and overall environmental
degradation due to the nature of extraction industry. The government passed “Mining
Prohibition Law” to ensure prevention of water contamination and forest degradation, but
weak enforcement mechanisms prevent accountability.
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CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION
The Mongolian democratic transition changed the economic and political fabric of
the country. In 1990, the country decided to reverse 70 years of socialism to modernize
its economic and political policies. The goal of the newly established country was to
stimulate economic growth and strive for social progress, with increasing its citizens’
living standards as the ultimate goal. Additionally, fair and democratic representation was
adopted to ensure everyone had the equal opportunity to participate in the political
process and had the power to challenge the government if the administration did not
adequately ensure societal wellbeing.
This thesis’ research questions encompassed series of interrelated inquiries
including 1) whether human development can be achieved through extraction industries
2) whether the source of FDI has a strong impact on development outcomes, and 3)
whether FDI influences state-led development efforts and decision making to the extent
that it threatens the development of Mongolian sovereignty.
The results showed that successful economic growth and societal progress
depends on the government’s ability to manage resources. As a relatively young
democracy, the research indicates that Mongolia is struggling to maintain a stable
political environment. Mongolia’s abundant natural resources provided an opportunity for
foreign investors to invest in developing the extraction industry. However, the
inexperience of Mongolia’s government and a lack of regulatory procedures hindered a
smooth partnership. The mining boom and increasing international attention forced the
government to experiment with various investment and mining laws. Unfortunately, the
laws were often inconsistent and without adequate clarifications for enforcement

58

guidelines. The uncertain investment environment discourages foreign investors. The
consequence of losing foreign investment can diminish economic growth and
subsequently, the funding for social welfare programs.
Although foreign investment can provide much economic benefit, the research
indicated that it could also erode state sovereignty if the country has weak enforcement
protocols. The research case study shows that the Chinese mining company undermined
state sovereignty by its unwillingness to comply with the Mongolian “strategic
importance” mining law. The Chinese company was able to assert its economic
dominance over the government to force the government to make an exception on its
behalf. A multinational corporation with financial power to force the government to
subvert its authority is dangerous for sovereignty.
The relationship between the Chinese corporation and the Mongolian government
clearly demonstrated the world systems theory in action. As the literature review
indicated, the core countries actively undermine the periphery to ensure
underdevelopment. The Chinese corporation’s action that undermined the Mongolian law
clearly indicates a core country exerting its power over a periphery. If Mongolia wants to
become a semi-periphery nation and compete in the international arena, the government
must act to protect its sovereignty.
A resolution can be found in Mongolia’s vibrant civil society. As demonstrated in
the background chapter and the case study, the Mongolian public is highly active in the
political sphere. In June 2016, the discontent with the ruling DP forced the public to oust
the DP and vote MPP in a landslide victory as the ruling party. The civil society held the
government accountable by participating in their civic duty through voting. Furthermore,
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citizens saw the increasing foreign influence in the Mongolian mining industry and
demanded laws that protect the interest of the Mongolian people and the environment.
Consequently, the government adopted more conservative laws in the mining sector.
Although some of the laws discouraged foreign investors, the public had the power to
force the government to act. These actions by the citizens are the reason that they play a
major role in the crucial “state building” process. Civil society engagement can help
combat government instability.
The literature review on development theory in Chapter 2 indicated the rise of
human development theory that prioritized societal wellbeing. Although the traditional
neoliberal development indicator, GDP will suggest that the increase in the Mongolian
GDP indicates development progress, the Mongolian citizens are pushing for a more
sophisticated form of human development. They demand policies that advance societal
wellbeing, such as better employment opportunities and environmental protection.
The literature and the data collected clarify the economic impact of foreign direct
investment. The data collected indicated that the economy did experience remarkable
growth thanks to the foreign direct investment in the extraction industry. However, as
literature indicates, resource-led development can be volatile. Mongolia’s overreliance on
one industry is one of the indicators of a “resource curse.” Chinese demand for
Mongolia’s copper and coal prioritized the mining industry as the main contributor to
national economic growth. Although natural resources yield fast cash and can be
extremely lucrative at times, it is based on market demand and the international political
environment. Either a decrease in commodity price or change in law of a major natural
resource importer can have a detrimental effect on an extraction-led economy. As
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demonstrated in Mongolia’s economy in 2015 and 2016, the decrease in China’s demand
for copper and coal contracted Mongolia’s double-digit GDP rate.
The government must work towards diversifying the industries that contribute to
economic growth. The lack of development of the agriculture sector has few harmful
consequences. First, the extraction industry is not sustainable. Eventually, the natural
resources will be exhausted. If there is not an alternative source of revenue, the economy
will inevitably collapse. Second, the mining sector is capital intensive and does not
require a large workforce. The revenues from the mining industry must be invested
towards the development of domestic industries such as agriculture. The existence of
diverse industries can create more employment opportunities. Adequate domestic
investment in the agriculture sector can alleviate the high unemployment rate because
agriculture is labor intensive. The necessity of agriculture development is outside the
scope of this thesis, however, it is an important topic for Mongolia’s food security.
Further research can provide additional information on the benefits of encouraging
agriculture sector. Nonetheless, considering long-term, future economic growth is
necessary for sustainable development.
Furthermore, the Mongolian tradition has always called for the preservation of the
ecosystem and the creatures that live among the herders. The conservation of cultural
heritage is an important aspect of Mongolian identity. The development of extraction
industries has had a detrimental effect on the environment and the lifestyle of the
traditional herders. Therefore the government of Mongolia should have a strict
enforcement procedure on environmental protection laws that hold foreign and domestic
investors accountable for any environmental degradation.
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Most importantly, equal societal progress must be one of the highest priorities of
the government. The remarkable economic growth did alleviate poverty and increased the
overall living standard of the people. However, there are regional disparities in access to
quality education, health care, and employment opportunity. There needs to be effective
social programs that target rural residents to improve their living standards. The success
of the government depends on the wellbeing of its citizens.
According to the results of the case study, the Chinese and Anglo-Australian
investors had a difference in regulatory compliance and corporate social responsibility. In
regards to compliance, the Anglo-Australian investor actions were more transparent than
the Chinese investor’s. The accessibility of documents, statistics, revenue reports and
company information was more readily available for OT. However, there is a variable
that the OT investors are well-established company with years of investment experience.
On the other hand, the Chinese investors are new to the extraction industry, and the
Khushuut mine was the first of its development projects. I argue that “inexperience” is
not an adequate explanation for the lack of transparency. I resolve that all multimilliondollar corporations in the extraction industry should maintain a high standard of
transparency, due to the inherently exploitative nature of the mining business. Therefore,
the lack of transparency should create suspicion and mistrust in the company.
As discussed in Chapter Three, the relationship between China and Mongolia is
complex. The Mongolian people are suspicious of the presence of Chinese investors. The
inherent pessimism alone could have swayed the locals to have a negative attitude
towards the Chinese mine, but the Chinese investors did not take genuine actions to build
a relationship with the community. The death of the boy might have set the tone for all
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future interactions, but the Chinese efforts to encourage community relationships were
seen as a conciliatory rather than genuine. The biggest objection towards the Chinese
presence is its 100% ownership of Mongolian natural resources. However, regarding the
OT development, the society has had a more accepting attitude. The people did not think
the Mongolian government had big enough shares, but it still had control of 34%. The
Anglo-Australian investor did provide skills training, housing, and a community hospital,
which had a positive reception from the locals.
The OT had a bigger influence in contributing to the economy than the Khushuut
mine. The Chinese investor was accused of not paying the appropriate amount of taxes
for years 2011 and 2012. The Chinese actions raise more questions than praise.
In regards to the environmental impact, the inherent nature of the extraction
industry is destructive to the environment. Environmental degradation is a part of the
mining business. Both mines are guilty of lacking appropriate measures to ensure
environmental protection. The government of the host country has the responsibility to
regulate environmental protection, but the environment destructive nature of extraction
business makes it hard to contain the damage.
The overall conclusion of the research indicates that Mongolia is at crossroads.
The mining boom provides significant revenue for economic growth. However, the
revenue is not sustainable, and it is highly volatile. The government of Mongolia needs to
decide what kind of agent it wants to be. Now, more than ever, the Mongolian
government has the opportunity to become one of the success stories like the “Asian
Tigers.” Not many countries succeed with the resource-led development, but Mongolia
has only three million people. The proper management of mining revenue and
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willingness to invest in domestic markets can have a significant influence on the growth
of the country.
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